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POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Thomas I. Emer-
son and David Haber. Buffalo: Dennis & Co., 1952. Pp. xx, 1209. $7.50.
PROFESSORS Emerson and Haber have given us a volume of materials on
political and civil rights that is remarkable in its coverage and the thorough-
ness of its documentation. The basic organization is neither historical nor
doctrinal nor institutional, but deliberately factual, a series of human free-
doms and controls as the ordinary citizen would conceive them. The nine
chapters of the book take up, in order, security of the person, fairness in
governmental procedures, the right of franchise, political organization and
expression, communication which is harmful or untruthful, control over places
and methods of communication, academic freedom, freedom of religion, and
discrimination in housing, education, transportation, public accommodations,
and employment. The materials are drawn from a rich quarry of sources;
in addition to a modicum of judicial opinions, there are excerpts from
the classics of civil liberties, Milton and Mill, from commentators legal
and non-legal, from Pope Leo XIII and Max Weber, from the self-censor-
ship code of motion picture producers and the declaration of principles of
academic freedom by the American Association of University Professors.
There are copious references to decided cases and to recent occurrences, and
there are voluminous bibliographies throughout.
It would be evident, even without the editors' prefatory remarks, that
the book is designed for a variety of readers-law students, lawyers, social
scientists, and citizens at large. To some extent the heterogeneity of the
audience has affected the accents employed by the editors. In the hands of
law students, for example, even more generous printing of the text of statutes
and ordinances, and particularly of draft statutes and ordinances, would be
highly useful, to develop the legislative faculty, to test the practicability of
court-imposed standards, and to probe the soft spots in the law. For legal
instruction such materials could well displace, if necessary, some of the more
purely informational and cumulative accounts of current events in the area
of civil rights. As the book stands, however, its usefulness is very great
indeed. For seminars in civil rights it provides problems, data, and leads
for investigation and reports. The lawyer with a civil rights case, or the
law clerk to a judge in such a case, would be irresponsible if he failed to con-
sult this repository, and he would be well-advised to consult it first. And its
contents ought to be familiar to lawyers whose concern with the subject is
less direct but, by reason of the very nature of the profession, no less real
and urgent.
If the book leaves one with any regret, it is that the editors have adhered
so exclusively to the arrangement by factual topics. The pictorial realism
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achieved by that arrangement might have been given greater perspective
had the editors allowed themselves to focus also on institutional problems.
Underlying the whole subject are issues of ways and means, of the roles
that should be played by courts, by legislatures local and national, and by
other agencies of civilization. These problems are implicit throughout. To
have made them more explicit by independent and concentrated attention
would, it seems to me, have given the book even greater philosophic depth
and even more utility for lawyership. One or two illustrations may point my
meaning.
In the Foreword, Robert M. Hutchins has aptly observed: "These cases
and materials will force the reader to re-think the most fundamental ques-
tions: the purpose of human life and of organized society; the relation of man
to the state; the conflict between freedom and security; and even, as in the
opinion of Chief justice Vinson in United States v. Dennis, the nature of
truth itself." 1 One of the most fundamental questions we have been forced
to re-think, certainly after the restrictive-covenant cases, is the relation of
private and public power in the restriction of human freedoms. One aspect
of the problem is the meaning of "state" action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and this the editors have developed in the first chapter, on security
of the person, but only insofar as it pertains to freedom from violence. By
this scrupulously "non-doctrinal" arrangement the problem is given, para-
doxcally, an unduly technical orientation. Not until we reach a section on
discrimination by realtors and landlords, at page 1013, do we come to grips
with Shelley v. Kraemer; and likewise the cases on company-towns, on
primary elections, and on radio reception in busses, all of which have some
light to throw on the basic problem, are relegated to their several topical
chapters. All legal private power is in a sense delegated public power; in
building a fence or making a will or forming a corporation or renting room
to guests at a hotel, each of us is acting as a little sovereign. How far is it
proper and desirable that constitutional guarantees be imposed to limit our
freedom of action in these and other capacities? These inquiries will doubt-
less be familiar to the law student who has had a general courie in conhti-
tutional law before using this book; but it is the non-legally trained reader,
inclined to be most impatient with "legalistic" analysis, who would profit
most from systematic exposure to these legal-philosophic problems which
transcend the separate categories of human rights.
Lawyership, too, I have suggested, would be promoted by a somewhat
less exclusive focus on the topical subject-matter, and more general con-
sideration of institutional devices. As this is being written, the most im-
portant civil-rights cases presently pending are those involving segregation
in public schools. How could a lawyer most effectively reach the minds of
judges on that issue? What problems are most vexing; what data most help-
ful? I venture to think that reports of tests made by psychologists, as e,-
1. P. iv.
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hibited in the chapter on discrimination, assessing the "psychodynamics" and
"ego attitudes" of Negro and white school children, are not likely to prove
compelling on the judicial mind. The judge of good will is apt to be satisfied
with his own intuition for the proposition that companionship in learning
makes for fellowship in life, perhaps remembering Lycidas:
"For we were nursed upon the selfsame hill,
Fed the same flocks, by fountain, shade and rill."
Nor is he likely to need much help in disavowing the unctuous language in
Plessy v. Ferguson 2 to the effect that if the enforced separation of the
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority it is only because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it. What the judge
stands most in need of from the advocate, or so it may be guessed, is counsel
on the problems of judicial administration which would be presented by a
decree requiring desegregation. What would be the problems of supervision,
for example, in the re-creation of school districts in residentially segregated
communities? Again, the problems transcend the specific subject matter.
They call to mind experiences and analogies such as antitrust decrees,
"umbrella" receiverships, petitions for the supervision of elections, and efforts
to secure judicial review of gerrymandered electoral districts. If for one rea-
son or another the Court is loath to overrule the "equal but separate" doc-
trine, could the Court drop the whole problem at the door of Congress, under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment? What analogies are there for
congressional supersedure of constitutional doctrine, in such fields as just
compensation, intergovernmental immunities, state regulation of commerce,
and illegally obtained evidence in state trials? This is not to suggest that a
book on civil and political rights must be a book on law in general. It is only
to insist that a "civil rights" lawyer, like a patent lawyer, may be exception-
ally effective in the degree to which he perceives the more general in the
particular; that sometimes, and judiciously, a "doctrinal" approach may be
the most "functional"; and that more cross-lights from within and without
the field of civil rights would make this searching study even more illuminat-
ing.
But these are really suggestions for a second edition. Meanwhile we can
only be grateful to Professors Emerson and Haber for putting their learning
and energies so lavishly and devotedly at our service. If the bar would turn
as eagerly to this volume in idle hours as to a book, say, of judicial humor,
or as assiduously in working days as to a commentary on the latest revenue
act, the profession would give some evidence, which many of our lay friends
are seeking, that its historic concern for human freedom has not abated.
PAUL A. FREUNDt
2. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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